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TERREP, INFORM CONSULS, GENEVA FOR RSO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, XG
SUBJECT: SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE CURRENT
TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE.
PART I

USSS/ID/FIB, DOE HQ: ATTH: RENWICK, DIA/OS-1B,
CIA/OGI/THAD/TAB

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY

THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT ON THE CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS PREPARED BY THE CY THREAT ANALYSIS GROUP. THE ASSESSMENT APPLIES TO THE FIRST HALF OF 1985. AN ASSESSMENT FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS WILL BE PREPARED IN JULY. THIS CURRENT ANALYSIS IS IN TWO PARTS. PART I DISCUSSES THE FOLLOWING NINE FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE HIGH THREAT LEVEL WHICH PREVAILS AT PRESENT IN THE REGION: (1) THE EMERGENCE OF THE COMMUNIST COMBAT CELLS (CCC) IN BELGIUM, (2) ATTACKS ON U.S. TARGETS IN PORTUGAL, (3) INCREASED ACTIVITY OF DIRECT ACTION IN FRANCE, (4) THE RESURGENCE OF THE RAF IN WEST GERMANY,

(5) THE RED BRIGADE THREAT CONTINUES IN ITALY, (6) CONTINUED THREAT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS, (7) TERRORIST POTENTIAL IN THE NETHERLANDS, (8) NOVEMBER 17 GROUP POSES A THREAT IN GREECE, AND (9) THE FORMATION OF AN "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" TERRORIST FRONT IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE LAST FACTOR, THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" FRONT, IS THE SUBJECT OF PART II OF THIS ASSESSMENT WHICH WILL FOLLOW IN SEPTEL. OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1985 ARE THE PARIS AIR SHOW AND THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULED VISIT TO EUROPE IN MAY. A LONG-TERM CONCERN IS THE USE OF STANDOFF WEAPONS, SUCH AS RPG'S AND MORTARS, BY TERRORIST GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE. WHEN THE ABOVE FACTORS AND CONCERNS ARE COMBINED, THE RESULT IS THE HIGHEST THREAT LEVEL EVER TO CONFRONT U.S. DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

3. THE CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN

WESTERN EUROPE HAS NEVER BEEN HIGHER. THE HIGH THREAT LEVEL IS A RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS WHICH, WHEN COMBINED, PRODUCE A TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

(A) THE EMERGENCE OF THE "COMMUNIST COMBAT CELLS" IN BELGIUM

THE CCC, THE FIRST INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUP TO SURFACE IN BELGIUM, BEGAN ITS OPERATIONS IN OCTOBER 1984. TO DATE THE GROUP HAS CARRIED OUT TWELVE BOMBING ATTACKS, EIGHT OF WHICH WERE DIRECTED AT U.S. MULTINATIONALS (HONEYWELL AND LITTON) INVOLVED WITH THE CRUISE MISSILE, AND NATO TARGETS (PIPELINE AND A SUPPORT SERVICES BUILDING). IN ITS INITIAL ATTACK COMMUNIQUE THE CCC STATED THAT IT HAD CARRIED OUT ITS BOMBING "WITH THE HIGHEST DISCRIMINATION, WITH THE HIGHEST SELECTIVITY" IN ORDER TO AVOID CAUSING CASUALTIES. ITS MOST RECENT COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, NOW SHOWS THAT IT HAS MOVED TO A NEW "REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE" WHICH INCLUDES ATTACKS "LIKELY TO HURT OR TO KILL YANKEE SOLDIERS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES." THE EMERGENCE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUP IN BELGIUM WILLING TO INJURE OR KILL U.S. PERSONNEL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THAT COUNTRY.

(B) ATTACKS ON U.S. TARGETS IN PORTUGAL

PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1984 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN PORTUGAL WAS ASSESSED AS LOW. THE MOST DANGEROUS INDIGENOUS GROUP THERE, THE "POPULAR FORCES OF APRIL 25" (FP-25), HAD NOT TARGETED U.S. INTERESTS.

MOREOVER, THERE WAS NO INTELLIGENCE WHICH EVEN SUGGESTED THAT THE FP-25 WOULD ATTACK U.S. TARGETS. ON OCTOBER 27, HOWEVER, THE FP-25 ATTEMPTED TO LAUNCH TWO M-20 ANTI-TANK ROCKETS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LISBON. A MECHANICAL FAILURE PREVENTED THE LAUNCHING OF THE ROCKETS FROM A MAKESHIFT LAUNCHER SITUATED SOME 150 YARDS FROM THE EMBASSY. ON NOVEMBER 25 THE FP-25 FOLLOWED UP THIS ATTEMPT BY FIRING FOUR 60 MM. MORTAR ROUNDS AT THE EMBASSY. THE ATTACK COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO FP-25'S OPPOSITION TO "THE PRO-IMPERIALIST ECONOMIC POLICY IMPOSED BY THE IMF," AND CONDEMNED AMERICAN BASES IN PORTUGAL, PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN NATO, AND PORTUGUESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY ACCORDS. ON DECEMBER 9 THE FP-25 FIRED FOUR MORTAR ROUNDS AT NATO'S IBERLANT HEADQUARTERS. ON JANUARY 29, 1985 THE GROUP AGAIN FIRED MORTAR ROUNDS. THIS TIME AT SIX NATO SHIPS IN THE PORT OF LISBON. THREE DAYS LATER THE GROUP BOMBED SEVERAL CARS BELONGING TO WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL STATIONED AT THE BEJA AIRFIELD. THE BEJA ATTACK COMMUNIQUE DEMANDED PORTUGAL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO, CLAIMED THAT THE GERMANS DISCHARGE NUCLEAR WASTE AND STORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT THE AIRFIELD, AND WARNED THAT THE GROUP WILL USE "ALL AVAILABLE MEANS" TO FORCE THE "UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN BASES FROM PORTUGAL." THE SHIFT TO U.S. TARGETS BY THE FP-25 AND THEIR USE OF MORTARS INCREASES THE TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN PORTUGAL.

(C) INCREASED ACTIVITY OF DIRECT ACTION IN FRANCE

DIRECT ACTION SIGNALLED ITS INTENT TO INTENSIFY ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST INSTITUTIONS OF THE "IMPERIALIST POLITICO-MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE" WHEN IT BOMBED ANNEXES OF THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INDUSTRY IN PARIS ON JULY 13-14, 1984. THE DA ATTACK COMMUNIQUE EXPLAINED THAT THE MOD ANNEX WAS "IN CHARGE OF THE TECHNICAL SUPERVISION AND PAYMENT OF ORDERS

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CONCERNING ARMAMENT EQUIPMENT" AND THAT THE NOI ANNEX WAS "IN CHARGE OF THE INTER-ALLIED PIPELINES, THE FUEL SUPPLIER TO NATO'S EUROPEAN BASES." IT ALSO BOMBED THE OFFICE OF THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS--"THE NATO THINK TANK." ON AUGUST 2, THE PARIS OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY ("PUTS POLITICAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND MILITARY DECISIONS CONCERNING SPACE INTO CONCRETE FORM") WAS BOMBED BY A DA COMMANDO. ON AUGUST 23 DA SET UP A CAR BOMB IN FRONT OF THE OFFICE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION WHICH DA CLAIMS "REFLECTS

PRIMARILY THE ATLANTIC INTEREST IN HAVING THE EUROPEAN CAPITALISTS PAY FOR DEFENSE AND DEVELOP CAPITAL THROUGH THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY." THE BOMB FAILED TO DETONATE. DURING OCTOBER 20-21 DA BOMBED TWO FRENCH DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS. THE ATTACK COMMUNIQUE ON THESE TWO BOMBINGS ENDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SLOGANS: "DESTROY THE IMPERIALIST PLAN AND ITS BRANCH NATO" AND "BROTHERHOOD WITH OUR COMRADES STRUGGLING FOR REGROUPMENT." THIS LATER REFERENCE MAY HAVE BEEN AIMED AT THE RAF IN WEST GERMANY WHO AT THE TIME WERE UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF REBUILDING. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND DANGEROUS CHANGE IN DIRECT ACTION TOOK PLACE ON JANUARY 25, 1985 WHEN A COMMANDO ASSASSINATED GENERAL AUDRAN, A MOD OFFICIAL INVOLVED WITH THE EXPORT OF FRENCH ARMAMENTS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, DA CARRIED OUT AN OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST A PERSON. PREVIOUSLY, DA LIMITED ITSELF TO STRAFINGS OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND BOMBINGS DESIGNED TO CAUSE ONLY PROPERTY DAMAGE. DA'S TARGETING EMPHASIS ON ELEMENTS OF NATO'S "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" AND OTHER WESTERN POLITICO-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND ITS ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL AUDRAN HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE INDIGENOUS TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN FRANCE.

(D) RESURGENCE OF RAF IN WEST GERMANY

SINCE THE ARRESTS OF KLAR, MOHNHAUPT, AND SCHULZ IN LATE 1982, THE RAF HAS BEEN GRADUALLY REBUILDING ITS LOGISTICAL NETWORK AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. THE DECEMBER 1984 HUNGER STRIKE WAS A SIGNAL THAT THE RAF HARDCORE FELT THAT THEIR REBUILDING WAS OVER. THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS AN AGITPROP (AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA) TACTIC DESIGNED TO LAUNCH THE CURRENT RAF OFFENSIVE. WE BELIEVE THE 1985 OFFENSIVE, IF NOT DISRUPTED BY POLICE ARRESTS, WILL BE MORE EXTENSIVE AND DANGEROUS THAN THE RAF'S 1977 CAMPAIGN (BUBACK, PONTO, KARLSRUHE, SCHLEYER) OR 1979-1981 OFFENSIVE (HAIG, RAMSTEIN, KROESSEN). RAF HARDCORE OPERATIONS WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED BY LOW-LEVEL BOMBINGS AND UNARMED PROPAGANDA ACTIONS BY THE RAF PERIPHERY (THEIR AGITPROP CORP). IT IS EXPECTED THAT RAF HARDCORE OPERATIONS WILL FOCUS ON ASSASSINATIONS OF UNPROTECTED WEST GERMAN JUDICIAL AND NATO MILITARY PERSONALITIES, U.S. AND WEST GERMAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIALISTS, AND WEST GERMAN AND U.S. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONS. RAF BOMBINGS WILL PROBABLY BE SELECTIVE AND DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE INNOCENT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. WHILE WE BELIEVE THE RAF HAS THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK PROTECTED PERSONALITIES (REFERENCE ATTACKS ON BUBACK, SCHLEYER, HAIG, AND KROESSEN), WE

SUSPECT THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE WILL RELY ON RUSES, DISGUISES, AND EXCELLENT SURVEILLANCE METHODS TO FACILITATE THEIR ASSASSINATIONS OF UNPROTECTED PERSONALITIES--THE TACTICAL THRUST OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN. IN THE PAST, THE RAF HAS NOT AGGRESSIVELY TARGETED U.S. DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS IN WEST GERMANY. HOWEVER, INDICATIONS THAT THE RAF HAD SHOWN A POTENTIAL TARGETING INTEREST IN THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN BONN AND THE FIREBOMBING OF THE CONSUL GENERAL'S RESIDENCE IN

FRANKFURT SUGGESTED THAT U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS IN WEST GERMANY MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED AS LOGICAL AND ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR THE RAF. IT IS OUR OPINION ALSO THAT THIS RAF THREAT REACHES OUTSIDE WEST GERMANY INTO THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND. THE RAF HAS EITHER CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS OR HAS SUPPORTERS IN THESE COUNTRIES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN JUNE 1979 THE RAF CARRIED OUT AN ATTACK ON GENERAL HAIG NEAR MOHS, BELGIUM. IT WOULD BE A SECURITY MISTAKE TO PERCEIVE THE RAF THREAT AS BEING LIMITED TO WEST GERMANY. FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE REASONS, THE CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN WEST GERMANY IS ASSESSED AS HIGH. THIS THREAT ALSO SPILLS OVER SOMEWHAT INTO THE COUNTRIES PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, THEREBY ADDING TO THE ALREADY EXISTING THREAT IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS.

(E) RED BRIGADE THREAT CONTINUES IN ITALY

IN 1984 THE RED BRIGADES (RB) CARRIED OUT ONLY ONE OFFENSIVE ACTION--THE FEBRUARY 15 ASSASSINATION OF LEAMON HUNT, THE DIRECTOR OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) IN THE SINAI AND A RETIRED U.S. DIPLOMAT. THE ATTACK COMMUNIQUE ON HUNT WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF NATO AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN COMISO. HOWEVER, EVEN DURING LATE 1984 WHEN THE CCC, FP-25, RAF AND DIRECT ACTION WERE ATTACKING NATO TARGETS IN EUROPE, THE RED BRIGADES DID NOT FOLLOW UP THE ATTACK ON HUNT WITH AN ATTACK ON A NATO TARGET IN ITALY. THIS RED BRIGADE INACTIVITY IS SURPRISING FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE RED BRIGADES, ALONG WITH THE RAF, WAS ONE OF THE PRIME ARCHITECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT" IN WESTERN EUROPE. AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1978, IN A RESOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC DIRECTORATE OF THE RED BRIGADES, THE RB CALLED ON THE RAF, THE ARMED NUCLEI FOR PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY (A PREDECESSOR OF DIRECT ACTION) IN FRANCE, AND THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENTS (IRA, ETA, FLNC) TO "DEVELOP THE HIGHEST HISTORICALLY POSSIBLE LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION, MUTUAL SUPPORT, AND

SOLIDARITY" AND MOVE TOWARD "POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ALL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS AND FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPE INTO ONE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRATEGY." MOREOVER, IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE DURING THE DOZIER KIDNAPPING, THE RB NOTED THAT THE "FIGHTING COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS OF THE RAF AND BR PUT THEMSELVES TODAY AT THE HIGHEST POINT OF ATTACK AGAINST THE WAR PROJECT EMBODIED BY NATO...AT THE HIGHEST POINT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST FIGHTING FRONT IN THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA." SECONDLY, OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE RB IS THAT THEY HAD IN 1984, AND STILL DO, THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ASSASSINATIONS SIMILAR TO THE ATTACKS ON GENERAL AUDRAN AND DR. ZIMMERMANN. IN OUR OPINION THE RB WILL BE SUBJECTED TO INCREASING PRESSURE FROM WITHIN AND FROM DIRECT ACTION AND THE RAF TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR THIS DEVELOPING "ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT" BY CARRYING OUT AN ANTI-NATO OPERATION IN ITALY. REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC DEBATE WITHIN THE RED BRIGADES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GROUP OR A FACTION OF THE GROUP WILL ATTACK A NATO TARGET IN ITALY WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE RB TO DEMONSTRATE SOME FORM OF SUPPORT FOR THE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT." THIS IS WHAT MAKES THE GROUP DANGEROUS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN ITALY.

(F) CONTINUED THREAT FROM MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS

WESTERN EUROPE CONTINUES TO BE THE PRIMARY OPERATIONAL

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AREA FOR MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST GROUPS. ONE DATA BASE INDICATES THAT OF THE 267 INCIDENTS WORLDWIDE IN 1984 BY TERRORISTS OF MIDDLE EAST ORIGIN, 66 OR 25 PERCENT TOOK PLACE IN EUROPE. SEVENTY-NINE (30 PERCENT) INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE IN LEBANON AND 37 OR 14 PERCENT OCCURRED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. THE POINT HERE IS THAT IF LEBANON AND THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE 267 INCIDENTS, EUROPE ACCOUNTS FOR SOME 44 PERCENT OF ALL MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THE 66 INCIDENTS IN EUROPE TOOK PLACE IN GREECE, GREAT BRITAIN, CYPRUS, FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN, WEST GERMANY, AUSTRIA, THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM AND TURKEY. FROM THIS LIST IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM MIDDLE EAST GROUPS IS PRIMARILY A "REGIONAL" PROBLEM. THIS PROBLEM AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE GROUPS OR STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR MIDDLE EAST TERRORIST ACTIVITY ARE ANTI-AMERICAN AND MUST BE CONSIDERED AS ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SOURCES FOR ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS. IN ADDITION TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF MIDDLE EAST

TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN EUROPE IN 1984, THERE ARE ALSO A LARGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS IN THE REGION LAST YEAR. MORE SO THAN IN RECENT YEARS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SOME 32 MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS WERE ARRESTED IN 16 SEPARATE INCIDENTS IN EUROPE LAST YEAR. THESE ARRESTS TOOK PLACE IN ITALY, SPAIN, FRANCE, GREECE, SWITZERLAND, WEST GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, AND CYPRUS. MOST OF THE ARRESTED TERRORISTS WERE EITHER LINKED TO PREVIOUS ATTACKS OR APPREHENDED DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN ATTACK. THE REMAINING TERRORISTS WERE CAUGHT TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS. THREE OF THE INCIDENTS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED U.S. TARGETS. IN MAY, ITALIAN POLICE ARRESTED TWO ARABS WHO POSSESSED SOME INNOCUOUS NOTES REFERRING TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS. IN OCTOBER, FRENCH POLICE ARRESTED THE SUSPECTED LEADER OF THE LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) WHICH IS LINKED TO FOUR ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN FRANCE. AND IN NOVEMBER THE ITALIAN POLICE DETAINED SEVEN LEBANESE, ONE OF WHOM HAD SURVEILLANCE NOTES AND A DIAGRAM OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ROME. WHILE THESE ARRESTS MUST BE SEEN AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN EUROPE, IT SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THEY ARE JUST FRAGMENTARY PIECES OF A LARGER PUZZLE WHICH WILL RESPOND TO THESE ARRESTS BY ALTERING ITS COMPOSITION. TRAVEL PROCEDURES WILL CHANGE. FALSE DOCUMENTATION WILL BE ALTERED. NEW METHODS OF CONCEALMENT WILL BE DEVELOPED. IT WILL BE HARDER TO INTERCEPT THESE CARRIERS IN THE FUTURE. THESE ARRESTS ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE EXTENSIVE LOGISTICAL BASE THAT MIDDLE EAST TERRORISTS HAVE ESTABLISHED IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE DISTURBING QUESTIONS FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT ARE HOW MANY POUNDS OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES WERE SUCCESSFULLY DELIVERED INTO WESTERN EUROPE? HOW MANY SURVEILLANCE NOTES OF U.S. EMBASSIES HAVE NOT BEEN DISCOVERED? THE ARREST OF TERRORISTS, AS WELL AS UNSUCCESSFUL TERRORIST PLANS, MUST BE FACTORED INTO ANY ANALYTICAL EQUATION WHICH DETERMINES THE THREAT LEVEL IN A PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR REGION. THE THREAT OF ATTACK BY MIDDLE EAST GROUPS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS A VIABLE AND GROWING SECURITY CONCERN.

(G) TERRORIST POTENTIAL IN THE NETHERLANDS

IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT A POTENTIAL EXISTS IN THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A TERRORIST GROUP SIMILAR TO THE CCC IN BELGIUM. INDIGENOUS TERRORIST

ACTIVITY IN THE NETHERLANDS HAS BEEN LIMITED IN THE PAST TO SOUTH MOULUCAN NATIONALIST GROUPS AND FLEETING ANARCHIST GROUPS LIKE THE "RED RESISTANCE FRONT" (RRF) AND ITS PREDECESSOR RED HELP. THE NETHERLANDS HAS ALSO CONTAINED A SMALL GROUP OF RAF SYMPATHIZERS. THIS GROUP WAS RECENTLY ACTIVE IN DECEMBER AND JANUARY WHEN THEY CARRIED OUT SEVERAL PROPAGANDA ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE HUNGER STRIKE IN WEST GERMANY. MOREOVER, IN 1977-1978 THERE WERE SEVERAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING RAF SHOOT-OUTS WITH THE DUTCH POLICE WHICH INDICATED THAT RAF MEMBERS HAD USED THE NETHERLANDS AS A SAFEHAVEN. ALL OF THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THERE IS A SUFFICIENT RAF-INFLUENCED RADICAL BASE IN THE NETHERLANDS FERTILE ENOUGH TO PRODUCE A TERRORIST GROUP LIKE THE CCC IN BELGIUM. THIS RADICAL BASE HAS PROBABLY GROWN IN RECENT YEARS AS A RESULT OF THE ANTI-INF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE NETHERLANDS. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF RAF SUPPORTERS, FORMER RRF MEMBERS, MILITANTS FROM THE "ONKRUIT" GROUP, AND FRUSTRATED ANTI-INF PROTESTORS TO STAFF A NEW TERRORIST GROUP. WHILE THERE IS NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION AT THIS TIME TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS "NORTHERN TERROR FRONT," WHICH HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THREE FIREBOMBINGS IN GRONINGEN IN 1985 AND HAS THREATENED FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST NATO TARGETS, IS THE DUTCH VERSION OF THE CCC, ITS ATTACKS ARE REFLECTIVE OF THE POTENTIAL TERRORIST BASE EXISTING IN THE NETHERLANDS.

(H) NOVEMBER 17 GROUP POSES A THREAT IN GREECE

THE THREAT OF AN ATTACK BY THE NOVEMBER 17 GROUP AGAINST A U.S. TARGET IN GREECE CONTINUES TO EXIST. THIS GROUP CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE DECEMBER 1983 ASSASSINATION OF A U.S. NAVY OFFICER AND THE APRIL 1984 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A U.S. ARMY NCO. THE ATTACK COMMUNIQUE FOR THESE INCIDENTS EXPRESSED POLITICAL THEMES WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE THEMES CONTAINED IN RECENT RAF, CCC, AND DIRECT ACTION COMMUNIQUE. WHILE THERE IS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF AN "ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT" IN WESTERN EUROPE, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE "FRONT" PER SE WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACKS ON CAPTAIN TSANTES AND SERGEANT JUDJ. THE JANUARY 1985 JOINT DA/RAF COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, DOES MAKE AN INDIRECT REFERENCE TO THE NOVEMBER 17 GROUP BY NOTING THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST ATTACKS IN "PORTUGAL, BELGIUM, SPAIN, GREECE, FRANCE, AND THE FRG." THE NOVEMBER 17 GROUP'S SELECTION OF ITS NEXT TARGET WILL INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT THIS GROUP

SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF THE "FRONT." THE FOLLOW-UP ATTACK COMMUNIQUE WILL ALSO BE A SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR. THE EXISTENCE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUP IN ANY COUNTRY IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THE FACT THAT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF THE GROUP HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED BY POLICE ARRESTS, DISCOVERY OF CONSPIRATIVE APARTMENTS, ETC., ONLY AMPLIFIES THAT CONCERN. THE NOVEMBER 17 GROUP REMAINS A DANGEROUS THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN GREECE.

(I) THE FORMATION OF AN "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" TERRORIST FRONT IN WESTERN EUROPE

THIS DEVELOPMENT IS THE SUBJECT OF A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS PRESENTED IN A SEPTEL TO FOLLOW. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS APPARENT ALLIANCE OF SOME EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDIGENOUS TERRORIST DEVELOPMENT TO TAKE PLACE IN EUROPE SINCE THE MODERN PERIOD OF POLITICAL TERRORISM BEGAN IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE LATE 1950'S.

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4. THERE ARE SEVERAL EVENTS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1985 WHICH MAY ALSO PRESENT SOME SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE PARIS AIR SHOW, WHICH TAKES PLACE IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY, BRINGS TOGETHER NUMEROUS WESTERN AEROSPACE AND AVIATION FIRMS. MANY OF THESE FIRMS HAVE DEFENSE CONTRACTS WITH NATO. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FRENCH POLICE TO PROTECT ALL OF THE DISPLAYS AND ALL OF THE DELEGATIONS. MOREOVER, THE AIR SHOW IS AN ANNUAL EVENT SO TERRORISTS COULD PLAN WELL IN ADVANCE FOR AN OPERATION. GIVEN THE CURRENT TARGETING EMPHASIS OF DIRECT ACTION AND THE RED ARMY FACTION, WE BELIEVE THE PARIS AIR SHOW, MORE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST, MUST BE CONSIDERED AS AN EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE AND VULNERABLE TARGET FOR A TERRORIST ATTACK. THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULED VISIT TO EUROPE IN EARLY MAY MAY ALSO CAUSE SOME SECURITY PROBLEMS. PRESIDENTIAL VISITS HAVE USUALLY PROVOKED NUMEROUS LOW-LEVEL BOMBINGS DIRECTED AT U.S. MILITARY, BUSINESS, AND DIPLOMATIC TARGETS. THESE BOMBINGS NOT ONLY TAKE PLACE IN COUNTRIES THE PRESIDENT WILL VISIT BUT ALSO IN OTHER COUNTRIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE VISIT WILL INCREASE THE SECURITY THREAT ON A REGIONAL LEVEL. TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS WILL USE THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA. SY/TAG WILL PREPARE A SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO THE VISIT FOR U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND BUSINESS INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

5. ANOTHER SECURITY CONCERN IS THE CONTINUED USE OF STANDOFF WEAPONS BY TERRORIST GROUPS. THE RECENT USE OF MORTARS BY THE FP-25 GROUP IN PORTUGAL IS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE OF THESE TYPES OF WEAPONS. THE FP-25 ALSO ATTEMPTED TO LAUNCH TWO M-28 ANTI-TANK ROCKETS FROM A MAKESHIFT LAUNCHER AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LISBON. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT AS WE DEVELOP BETTER PERIMETER SECURITY MEASURES AND DEPLOY MORE ARMORED VEHICLES FOR OUR PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, THE TERRORISTS WILL ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THESE MEASURES WITH STANDOFF WEAPONS WITH AN ARMOR-PIERCING CAPABILITY. THE PROCUREMENT OF THESE WEAPONS IS DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR TERRORIST GROUPS. SOME OF THE GROUPS HAVE STOLEN THESE WEAPONS, OTHERS HAVE BOUGHT THEM OR PROCURED THEM FROM THE BLACK MARKET IN EUROPE OR FROM MIDDLE EAST SOURCES. THE RAF, RED BRIGADES, IRA, FP-25, AND ETA-M HAVE ALL AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER USED A STANDOFF WEAPON. THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS HAVE BEEN USED BY EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS: M-28 ANTI-TANK ROCKET, RL-83 "BLINDICIDE" LAUNCHER, RPG-7, M6AS ANTI-TANK ROCKET, 60 MM. MORTAR ROUNDS, M-72 LAW, AND THE 65AC28R2 ANTI-TANK RIFLE GRENADE. THE SEPTEMBER 1981 RAF ATTACK ON USA GENERAL KROESSEN IN HEIDELBERG WITH AN RPG-7 REPRESENTS THE IDEAL USE OF THIS WEAPON AGAINST A MOTORCADE. THE FEBRUARY 1982 ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MADRID AND THE OCTOBER 1984 ATTEMPT BY THE FP-25 ARE GOOD EXAMPLES OF HOW TERRORISTS WILL USE AUTOMATICALLY-TIMED MAKESHIFT LAUNCHERS TO FIRE ANTI-ARMOR ROCKETS OVER PERIMETER SECURITY MEASURES. WE EXPECT TERRORISTS TO USE THESE TYPES OF WEAPONS MORE AND MORE TO COUNTER OUR SECURITY MEASURES. (NOTE: RSO'S SHOULD READ AGAIN SY/TAG'S STUDY ON THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS BY TERRORISTS IN LESSONS LEARNED III, DATED DECEMBER 1981.)

6. RELEASABLE TO NATO COUNTRIES AS NATO CONFIDENTIAL.
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